36.
*

*

ULTRA VIRES CONTRACT OF A CORPORATION.

them to their damage, was held responsible to the owner. In Barry
v. Arnaud, xo Adol. & Ellis, 646, a
collector of customs was held to be
an immediate officer of thp Crown,
whose functions were ministerial.
Being a public ministerial officer,
Lord DgNMAN, C. J., held (p. 671),
he is responsible for neglect of his
certain limited duty to any individual' wh'o sustains damage by
such neglect.
From the foregoing cursory consideraton of some of the prominent

cases touching the responsibility
of public officials to individuals
suffering because ofithe negligent
performance of their duties, it
would appear to be well established,
that unless there is a material discretion as to the conduct of the
office reposed in the public official,
his functions are considered as
ministerial, and for) negligently
performing them he is liable in
damages to an individual who is
specially injured.
ALMUID R OLAND HAIG.
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Ultra Vires Contract c/a Corporation. Lease ofa Railroadto Another
Corioration.
A lease for 999 years b6y one railroad corporation of its railroad and
franchises to another railroad corporation, which is ultra vires of one or
both, will not be set aside by a court o'f equity at the suit of the lessor,
when the lessee has been in possession, paying the stipulated rent, for
seventeen years, and has taken no steps to repudiate or rescind the contract.

Aoeal from the decision of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to a bill of equity.
'Mr. Freedley's services as editor of this department were secured
too late to permit him to examine Mr. Woodruff's annotation. The general editors of the magazine are, therefore, alone responsible. Hereafter,
Mr. Freedley will revise all 'annotations appearing in this department.
-- EWs.
145 U. S., 393. Decided May 16, 1892.
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STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

In 1865 the plaintiff corporation was incorporated by
an Illinois statute (amended in 1867 by another statute), to
construct and maintain a railroad from the left bank of
the Mississippi River, opposite St. Louis, eastward through
Illinois to a convenient point on the Wabash River, for
extending its road to Terre Haute, Indiana. The defendant corporation was incorporated in 1847 by an Indiana
Statute (amended by another statute in 1865), to construct
and maintain 'a railroad from some point on the western
boundary line of Indiana eastward through Terre Haute to
Indianapolis. The plailitiff was not authorized by its
charter, or by any law of Illinois, to lease its railroad or by
any contract or conveyance to part with the entire possession, control and use of its property and franchises, or to
deprive itself of and vest in others the power of control in
the management of its said road and other property, and in
the exercise of its franchises. The defendant corporation
was not authorized by its charter, or by any law of Indiana,
to make or accept any lease, contract or other conveyance
by which it should acquire or obtain, either indefinitely or
for a fixed time, the ownership, management or control of
any railroad located beyond the limits of Indiana.
The road of the plaintiff was completed on or about
July I, 1870; to obtain money for this purpose a mortgage,
to secure $1,9oo,ooo worth of bonds, was executed on

April 6, 1867; and a second mortgage, to secure $2,6oo,ooo
worth of additional bonds, was executed March 13, 1868.
Under the first mortgage provision was made for setting
apart $2o, ooo annually as a sinking fund for the payment of
the bonds secured thereunder; no such provision was made
under the second mortgage, and all of said bonds were sold,
outstanding and unpaid.
February IO,1868, the plaintiff and defendant executed a lease, whereby the railroad property and franchises
of the plaintiff were leased for 999 years to the defendant,
who was to retain sixty-five per cent. (afterward increased
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to seventy per cent.), of the gross receipts; the balance to
be applied to the payment of the interest in the aforementioned mortgage bond of the plaintiff; any surplus to
go to. the plaintiff.
The Illinois Statute of February i6, 1865, made it unlawful for any railroad company of Illinois, or its directors,
to consolidate its railroad with any railroad out of the
State, or to lease its railroad to any railroad company out
of the State, without the written consent of all its stockholders within the State. Fifty-nine of the stockholders of
the plaintiff corporation, residing in Illinois, never consented to or ratified the lease.
The bill, filed July 6, 1887, after setting forth the
above facts, alleged further, that the defendant had received,
in tolls and otherwise, $21,6oo, ooo; that the pretended
lease was void for want of lawful power in either party to
enter into it; that the defendant, by taking possession of
the plaintiff's road, and without right, became in equity a
trustee of the plaintiff, and liable to account to it for the
property; that the defendant had refused to hand over the
property, though requested to do so.
The bill prayed for a cancellation'and surrender of the
lease; for a return of the railroad and other property held
under it; for ari injunction against disturbing the plaintiff in
the possession and control thereof; for an account; or if the
lease should be held valid for an account and for farther
relief.
The defendant demurred to the bill for want of equity,
for laches, for multifariousness, and because the plaintiff
had an adequate remedy at law. The demurrer was sustained; and the plaintiff, by leave of court, amended the
bill by striking out the prayer for alternative relief, in case
the lease should be held to be valid. The defendant
demurred to the amended bill, on the same grounds as
before, except multifariousness. Demurrer sustained.. The
plaintiff appealed.
GRAY, J.: This lease of the railroad and its franchises,
for a term of 999 years, was a contract which neither cor-
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poration had the lawful power to enter into, unless expressly
authorized by the statute which created it, and which, if
beyond the scope of the lawful powers of either corporation,
was unlawful and wholly void, could not be ratified or
validated by either or both, and would support no action or
suit by either against the other.
The statute of Illinois of February 16, 1865, relied
upon by plaintiff, declaring leases made without the written
consent of Illinois stockholders "shall be null and void,"
would seem to be enacted for the protection of such stockholders alone, and intended to be availed of by them only;
and then it is unnecessary to prove that the contract was
beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff if it dan be
proved to have been beyond the corporate powers of the
defendant, because, as established by this court, a contract
beyond the corporate powers of either party is as invalid
as if beyond the corporate powers of both, and the contract
now in question -was clearly beyond the corporate powers of
the defendant. The defendant cannot avail. itself of the
laws of Illinois, because such a suit as this is governed, so
far as regards the validity of the contract, not by the law
of the forum, but by the law of the contract; the statute of
Illinois was manifestly intended to confer power on domestic
corporations only, leaving the powers of corporations incorporated elsewhere to be determined by the laws, by and
under which they were incorporated, even if a State could
confer on a foreign corporation powers it did not have by
the laws of its own State.1 It may, therefore, be assumed
that the contract in question was ulira vires of the defendant, and, therefore, did not bind either party, and neither
party could have maintained a suit upon it, at law or in
equity, against the other. The general law in equity, as
in law, is in fiari delicto fiot r est condilio defendentis,
and, therefore, neither party to an illegal contract will be
aided by the court, whether to enforce it or to set it aside.
I Canada Southern Railway v. Gebbard, lO9 U. S., 527, 537; Christian
Union v. Yount, 1l U. S., 352; Starkweather v. American Bible Society,
72 li., 5o; Santa Clara Academy v. Sullivan, 116 U. S., 375, 385.
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The plaintiff in this case is in the position of alienating
the powers which it had received from the State and the
duties which it owed to the public to another corporation,
which it knew had no lawful capacity to exercise those
powers or perform those duties. If, as the plaintiff contends, the contract was also beyond its own corporate
powers, it is certainly in no better condition. In either
aspect of the case the plaintiff was in pani delicto with the
defendant. The invalidity of the contract, in view of the
laws of which both parties were bound to take notice, was
apparent on its face. The contract has been fully executed,
on the part of the plaintiff, by the actual transfer of its railroad and franchises to the defendant; and the defendant has
held the property, and paid the stipulated consideration
from time to time, for seventeen years, and has taken Vo steps
to rescind or repudiate the contract. Upon this statement
of facts, for the reasons above stated, the plaintiff, considered
as a party to the unlawful contract, has no right to invoke
the assistance of a court of equity to set it aside. And so
far, as the plaintiff corporation can be considered as representing the stockholders, and seeking to protect their
initerests, it and they are barred by laches. The Court will
not disturb the possession of the property that has passed
under the contract, but will refuse to interfere as the matter
stands.
Decree affirmed.
CORPORATION CONTRACrS ULrRA. VIRS.

In Colman v. Eastern Counties
Railway Company (io Beavan, I),
decided in 1846, we have the earliest Znglish discussion of the doctrine of ultra vires. LANGDA.L,

M. R., in delivering his decision
said: "I am cearly of the opinion
-

that the powers which are given by
an Act of Parliament, like that now
in question, extend no further than
is expressly stated in the Act, or
is necessarily and properly required
for carrying into effect the under-

taking and works which the Act
has expressly sanctioned." The
Eastern Counties Railway Company was chartered by Parliament
to construct and maintain a railway
between London and Manningtree.
The Company, to extend and enlarge its business, proposed to
pledge its funds to support the Harwich Steam Packet Company about
to be formed, and to guarantee not
only five per cent. interest on the
stock, but also the full amount of
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the subscription in case of the
failure of the Company. Colman,
a stockholder, prayed for an injunction to restrain the company
from so pledging its funds, and the
Court granted the injunction, the
Master of the Rolls holding that
there was nothing in the Act of
Parliament which authorized the
railway company to enter into such
a transaction, and further that the
acquiescence of the stockholders
afforded no ground whatever for
the presumption of its legality.
The plaintiff in his bill expressly
set forth the fact that the defendant
had as yet entered into no agreement or contract with the Steamship Company.
Five years later, in East Anglian
Railway Co. v. Eastern. Counties
Railway Co., ii C. B., 775, the defendant company under a sealed
indenture agreed, inter alia,to pay
the cost of certain pending Parliamentary bills, authorizing the amalgamation df the plaintiff and defendant companies. The defendant did not pay the bills, and as a
defence to an action at law to recover the amount, entered the defence that- the contract was eltra
vires, therefore void. The Court
held this defence to be good, as the
contract was not within the scope
of the authority of the company as
a corporation. The Chief Justice
relied upon the authority of Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway
Co. in reaching this conclusion.
There is, however, a distinct difference between the two cases which
he failed to observe. The case of
Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co. was one where the plaintiff,
a stockholder, sought (successfully)
to restrain the corporation from
doing that which it had no author-

ity to do; in the second case, however, the two corporations entered
into a contract, which the plaintiff
on its part had executed. When,
however, they demanded that the
defendants perform their part of
the contract, they were met with
the assertion that the defendants
had no authority to make such a
contract; allhough they 'had received the benefit of the plaintiff's
performance, they refused to do
their share. They kept the penny
and the cake. In Colman v. Railway Co. there was no contract; only
one proposed; no one had assumed
any obligation. In the latter case,
a contract had been entered into
and partly performed,, one of the
parties having done all that it had
agreed to do.
Chief Justice LAWRENCE, in
Bradley v. Ballard (55 Ill., 413), in
commenting on a similar case, said:
"It is said by the counsel for the
complainant that a corporation is
not estopped to say, in its defence,
that it had not the power to make
a contract sought to be enforced
against it, for the reason that if
thus estopped its powers might be
indefinitely enlarged. While the
contract remains unexecuted on
both sides this is undoubtedly true,
but when, under cover of this principle, a corporation seeks to evade
the payment of borrowed money,
on the ground that, although it
had the power to borrow money,
it expended the money borrowed
in prosecuting a business which it
was not authorized to prosecute, it
is pessing the-doctrine of ultra
vires to an extent that can never
be tolerated, even though the
lender of the money knew that the
corporation was transacting a business beyond its chartered powers,
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and that his money would be used
in such business, provided the
business itself was free from any
,intrinsic immorality or illegality.
Neither is it correct to say that the
application to corporations of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel,
where justice requires it to be applied, as when, under a claim of
corporate power they had received
benefits for which they refused to
pay, from a sudden discovery that
they had not the power they had
claimed, can be made the means of
enabling them; indefinitely to ex-tend their powers. If that were
true it would be an insuperable objection to the application of the
doctrine, even for the purpose of
preventing injustice in individual
cases. But it is not true. This
doctrine is applied only for the purpose of compelling corporations to
be honest, in the simplest and
commonest sense of honesty, and
after whatever mischief may belong
to the performance f an act ultra
vires had been accomplished. But
'while a contract remains executory,
it is perfectly true that the powers
of corporations cannot be extended
beyond their proper. limits for the
purpose of enforcing a contract.
Not only so, but 6n the application
of a stockholder, or of iny other
person authorized to make the application, a 'Court of Chancery
would interfere and forbid the execution of a contract ultra zires; so,
too, if a contract ultra vires is
made between a corporation and
another person, and while it is yet
wholly unexecuted the corporation
recedes, the other contracting
party would probably have no
claim for damages. But if such
other party proceeds in the performance of the contract, expending his money and his labor in the
production of values which the

corporation appropriates, we can
never hold the corporation excused
from payment on the plea that the
contract was beyond its powers.
Take, for example, the case of a
corporation chartered to build a
railway from Chicago to Rock
Island. Under such a charter the
company would have no power to
build steamboats, for the purpose
of running a line of such vessels
between Rock Island and St. Louis.
But suppose, notwithstanding the
want of power, it should make a
contract for the building of a vessel, and it is built by the contractor,
and accepted and used by the railway, could any court pemit the
corporation, when sued for the
value of the vessel, to excuse itself
from payjnent on the ground that,
although it has and uses the steamer,
it had no authority to do so by its
charter? Or, suppose that instead
of having a vessel built by a contractor it employs a superintendent
to build it and hires mechanics by
the day, could it escape the payment of their wages on the ground
that it had employed them in a
work ultra vires)?
"In cases of such character,
courts simply say to a corporation
you cannot in this case raise the
question of your powerto make the
contract. It is sufficient that you
have made it, andby so doing have
placed in your corporate treasury
the fruits of another's labors, and
every principle of justice forbids
that you be permitted to evade payment by an appeal to the limitations of your charter."
While the Supreme Court of Illinois is so strongly of this opinion,
the United States Supreme Court in
a number of cases, beginning with
Pearce v. Railroad, in I858, held to
the contrary.
In Pearce v. Madison and Indian-
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apolis R. R. Co., and Peru and In- illustration of the extremest applidianapolis R. R. Co., 21 How., 441,
cation of what we may call the metthe two defendant companies had aphysical interpretation of the docconsolidated under a common
trine of ultravires as distinguished
board of management. The con- from the practical.
solidated company, through its
Justice CAMPBELL in this case,
president, gave five promissory
and C. J. JERviS, in East Anglian
notes in payment for a steamboat R. W. Co. v. Eastern R. W. Co.,
to be used in conjunction with the held that a corporation can do only
railroad. Subsequently the consol- what its charter authorizes it to do.
idation was dissolved and each com- It has no power to do anything be- \
pany assumed control of its own yond its charter powers. This is
affairs. The plaintiff in this case all true as far as it goes, but it does
became the assignee. of the five not go far enough. We all admit
notes and claimed that both compa- that a corporation's powers are limnies were liable. The defendants
ited and defined by its charter, but
held that the consolidation and pur- cases can easily be conceived where chase of the boat were ultra vires; the corporations exceed the powers
the contract therefore was void and granted them by their charters.
the plaintiff was not entitled to re- When this is done, what obligations
cover. The Supreme Court affirmed
and duties arise first on their part;
the decision of the Circuit Court, secondly, on the part of those with
holding that the defendants had no whom they deal? Judge CAMPBELL
authority to consolidate, and per- and C. J. JgRvis take the exsons dealing with the managers of treme position, and hold that when
a corporation must take notice of a col-poration exceeds'its powers,
their authority as contained in the the act is void and no obligations or
act of incorporation. "It is con- duties arise. Furthermore, they
cluded, that because the steamboat hold it is incumbent upon every
one dealing with a corporation towas delivered to the defendants,
and has been converted to their use, carefully scrutinize its powers and.
they are responsible. It is enough
beware lest it does not exceed its
to say in -reply to this, that the powers in dealing with them. The
plaintiff was not the owner of the absurdity of this latter position
boat, nor does he claim under an will be manifest on examining the
assignment of the owner's interest. leading English case of Ashbury v.
His suit is instituted on the notes Riche, where it took the highest
as an endorsee; and the only ques- *courts in England seven years to
tion is, had the corporation the ca- determine whether a certain act
pacity to make the contract, in the was or was not ultra vires. It is
corporations
fulfillment of which they were exe- doubtful whether
cuted? The opinion of the Court would be enabled to transact any
is that it was a departure from the large amount of'business if every
business of the corporation, and one dealing with them firstinquired
that their officers exceeded their as to their power to transact bfisiauthority."
ness. In active business, some
From all that appears on the rec- things must be taken, if not for
granted, at least on the good faith
ord, the plaintiff was an innocent
holder for value. The case is an of the transacting parties. When
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we deal with a corporation it is to
be assumed that its officers are acting within their authorized powers.
Endless trouble and worriment
would ensue if every time we dealt
with a corporation, we examined
its charter, the statutes governing
it, and its by-laws. The broader
view adopted by nearly all the State
courts in this country is this: it is
entirely possible for a corporation
to exceed its powers; when it does
enter into a contract with another party, in good faith (provided
the contract is not intrinsically illegal) the corporation is compelled to
perform its share if the other party
has performed his. It is liable to
a penalty, however, for the attorney-general may find reason to ask
for a writ of quo warranto for the
Metaforfeiture of the charter.
physically speaking, a corporation
cannot do what it has no authority
to do; yet practically it can and.
does, and when it so does, it cannot
escape doingwhat is fair and equitable, although it can be made to
suffer a penalty for transgressing its
authority. We shall see as we proceed with the examination of the
cases that the United States courts
incline to the former, the State
courts to the latter, view..
The application of the doctrine
of utra ires in Thomas v. R. R.
Co., 1o U. S., 71, decided in 1879,
was eminently fair and worked no
injustice to either party.
In 1863 the plaintiffs entered into
a lease with the Millville and Glassboro R. R. for twenty years; the
plaintiffs to run the railroad for onehalf of the gross receipts; the contract could be terminated at any
time within said twenty years, and
the railroad revert to the company under certain conditions.
In 1867 the R. R. Co. gave the

required notice. In 1868 the
legislature of New Jersey authorized the M. and G. R. R. Co. to
consolidate with the West Jersey
R. R. Co. A committee of arbitra-

trators appointed

awarded

the

plaintiffs $159,437.07, as the value
of the unexpired lease to be paid

bythe West Jersey R. R. Co. This
award was set aside in a suit in
The plaintiffs appealed.
equity.
J. MILTER delivering the opinion held that the contract was not
within the powers of the company.
"The doctrine in this country is

that the powers of corporations organized under legislative statutes
are such only as those statutes confer. The charter of a company is
the measure of its powers; the enumeration of these powers implies
the exclusion of all others.
"In many instances where an invalid contract which the party to it
might have avoided or refused to
perform has been fully performed
on both sides, whereby money has
been paid or property changed
hands, the courts have refused to
sustain an action for. the recovery
of the property or the money so
transferred. The rule has been well
laid down by C.J. CoMScK, in
Parrish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y., 494,
that the executed dealings of corporations must be allowed to stand
for and against both parties when
the plainest- rules of good faith require it. But in this case what is
sought is the enforcement of the
unexecuted part of this agreement.
We cannot seethatthe present case
comes within the principle that requires that contracts which, though
invalid for want of corporated
power, have been fully executed,
shall remain as the foundation of
rights acquired by the transaction."
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In Central Transportation Co. v.
Pullman Car Co., 139 U. S., 24, Justice GRAY (who delivered the opinion in Davis v. Old Colony R. R.
infra) applies the extreme view,
after a full consideration of all the
cases on the subject, saying on
p. 59: "A contract of a corporation which is ultra vires, in the
proper sense, that is to say outside
the object of its creation as defined
in the law of its organization; and
therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature,
is not voidable only, but wholly
void, and of no legal effect The
objection to the contract is not
merely that the corporation ought
not to have made it, but that it
could not make it. The contract
c nnot be ratified by either party,
because it could not have been
authorized by either. .No performance on either side can give an
unlawful contract any validity, or
be the foundation of any right of
action lpon it."
We have noticed the two earliest
English cases, the second one being
an extreme application of the doctrine of ultra vires;later cases modified this application, and In re.
Cork and Youghal Railway Co., L.
R. 4, Ch. App., 748, where certain
bonds had been issued ultra vires
of the company, GIFFARD,L. J., at
p. 760, says: "This case amounts
to this: Documents were given under the seal of the company. These
documents represented that the
company was indebted to Mr. D.
L. Lewis in the amount there stated; they were given for the purpose
of being deposited by him as' security for advances to be made; and
if the representations in them had
been true, those who had advanced
their money on the deposit would
have been assignees of the debts

actually owing from the company
to Lewis, and the transaction would
have been perfectly legal.
"Now in this case the representations in the alleged bonds are
either true or false, or partly true
and partly false. In so far as they
are true, the transactions are legitimate, for Mr. Lewis could assign
his debt or debts. On the other
hand, in so far as they are false,
there was fraud on the part of the
directors of the company. The representations on the face of the alleged bonds purported to be representations by the company, and
induced the loans, and were made
in order that the loans might be
obtained. In so far, therefore; as
the company had the benefit of
those loans for its leitimate purposes it must be taken to have
adopted the transaction. It cannot
be heard to say the contrary and to
that extent must be held liable."
The leading English case on the
subject, however, is Ashbury Railway and Carriage Co. v. Riche, L.
R., 7 H. of L., 65, already referred
to as occupying the attention of the
Bench of England for seven years.
It was decided in 1875 by the House
of Lords reversing the preceding
judgments of the Court of Exchequer and Exchequer Chambers.
The Ashbury Railway and Carriage Co., registered under the
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1862,
had, according to the memoranda of
association, these powers: "To
make and sell or lend on time, railway carriages and wagons and all
kinds of railway plants, fittings,
machinery and rolling stock; to
carry on the business of mechanical
engineers and general contractors;
to purchase, lease, work and sell
mines, minerals, lands and buildings; to purchase and sell as mer-
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chants timber, coal, metals, and
other materials, and to buy and
sell such material on commission or
as agents."
Possessing these powers the directors entered into an agreement
for building a railway in Belgium,
and afterward, on account of difficulties arising from the laws of Belgium, agreed to assign the concession to a Societe Anonyme, to supply the materials for the construction and to be supplied with money
by the English company. The contract for constructing the line was
given to Messrs. Riche, who commenced work and continued the
work for a time, the Ashbury Company paying money to said Messrs.
Riche for some time. Difficulties
arose about payment as the work
went on, the -English shareholders
not adopting the views of their directors as to the speculation. In
May, 1867, they adopted a report
disapproving of what had been done
by the directors in the matter; an
amicable settlement was proposed
by which the directors were to purchase from the Ashbury Company
any estate or interest which the
companyznight have in the contract
or concession. The company, however, dealing with Messrs. Riche,
repudiated the contract for constructing theline as one ultra vires.
Riche brought an action of damages for breach of contract. CAIRNS,
L. C., on p. 672, said: "In such a
case as this, it is noi a question
whether the contract sued upon involved that which is malum fiohibium or malum ina seor is contrary -to public policy and illegal in
itself. I assume the contract to be
perfectly legal; to have nothing in
it obnoxious to thedoctrine involved
in the expressions which I have
used. The question is not as to the

legality of the contract: the question is as to the competency and
power of the company to make the
contract. This contract was entirely
beyond the objects in the memorandum of association, and beyond the
power of the company to make it.
If it was void at the beginning, it
was because the company could not
make the contract. The acquiescence of every stockholder to the
contract would not have validated
it. Iam unable to adopt the suggestion of the counsel that when
the shareholders found that something had been done by the directors which ought not to have been
done, they might be authorized to
make the best they could of a difficulty into which they had thus been
thrown, and therefrom might be
deemed to possess power to sanction the contract being proceeded
with. The directors might do that
which even the whole company
could not do, and then the shareholders could sanction what they
could not antecedently have authorized. The contract is extra vires,
wholly null and void, and it cannot
beratified."
The Supreme Court of the United
States has fiequently relied upon
Ashbury Co. v-. Riche, quoting it
with approval in a number of cases.
Not so with our State courts, who
have quite generally adopted the
broader application of the doctrine,
As early as 1839, in Massachusetts.
a case arose involving the application of the doctrine. One White
had deposited an amount of money
in a bank, and the cashier gave
him a book with a certificate, that
the money was to be paid to White
at a certain time. This transactionthe courts held to be a promise to
pay money a future day certain,
ultra vires of the cashier or the
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bank. On a suit to recover the
-money before the time mentioned
on the certificate had expired, the
bank entered the defence that the
contract was ultra vires, therefore
void. The Court held that while
-no action could be maintained
against the bank on the express
contract, the money might be recovered in an action commenced
before the expiration of the time
for which it was to remain in deposit, the parties not being in pari
.delido,and the action being in disaffirmance of the illegal contract:
White v. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick.,
181.
Comyns, in the second volume of
his work on Contracts, page log,
edition i8o9, stated the law on this
subject as follows: "When money
has been paid upon an illegal contract, itis a general rule that if the
contract be executed, and both parties are in piari delicto, neither of
them can recover from the other
money so paid; but if the contract
continues executory, and the party
paying the money be desirous of
rescinding it, he may do so, and recover back in an action of indebtilatus assumpsit for money had and
received. And this distinction is
taken in the books, namely, where
the action is an affirmance of an
illegal contract, the object of which
is to enforce the performance of
an engagement prohibited by law,
clearly, such an action can in no
case be maintained; but where the
action proceeds in disaffirmance of
such a contract, and instead of endeavoring to enforce, presumes it
to be void and seeks to prevent the
defendant from retaining the benefit which he derived from an unlawful act, there it is consonat to
the spirit and policy of the law
that the plaintiff should recover."

Subsequently, however, probably
under the influence of GRAY, C. J.,
afterward promoted to the U. S.
Supreme Bench, and the author of
the decision in Central Trans. Co.
v. Pullman Car Co. (supfra), and
St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Terre
Haute, etc., R. R. Co., the Massabhusetts Court adopted the extreme
view of the doctrine in Davis v. Old
Colony R. R. and in Davis v. Smith
Organ Co., 131 Mass., 258. The R.
R. Co. was organized under the
laws of Massachusetts to construct
and maintain a railroad. The Organ Co. was organized under Mas-sachusetts laws to manufacture organs. Yet each agreed to pay a
certain proportionate share of the
loss, if any, incurred in holding the
World's Peace Jubilee and International Musical Festival. The Jubilee was held, there was a loss incurred in conducting it, and the two
defendant companies refused to pay
their share, and as a defence to the
action brought against them entered the plea ultra vires, which
the Supreme Court sustained. The
same question arose in another
State (Indiana), the facts being essentially the same, and was differently settled: State Board of Agriculture v. Citizens' Railway Co.,
47 Ind., 407, infra.
The Massachusetts Court, however, has reverted to its original
position, holding in Slater Woolen
Co. v. Lamb, 143 Mass., 420, that a
corporation organized for "the purpose of manufacturing fabrics of
worsted and wool or a mixture
thereof, with other textile materials," may maintain an action for
groceries, dry goods and.other similar articles, sold and delivered by
and in the name of a person who is
keeping store as the undisclosed
agent of the corporation, to a per-
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son not employed by the company,
who retains and uses the goods,
even if the contracts of sale are not
within the powers conferred upon
the corporation by its charter. The
Court took occasion to say that the
contracts in question were not v9id
as against public policy or good
morals; the defect consisted in
the company having exceeded its
powers.
In New York the Courts have
uniformly applied the doctrine in
its broader interpretation; as early
as 1853, PARKER, J., in Steam Navigation Co. v. Weed, 17 Barb., 378,
saying: "When it is a simple question of capacity or authority to contract, arising either on a question of
regularity or organization, or of
powers conferred by the charter, a
party who has had the benefit of
the contract cannot be permitted
to question its validity in an action
founded upon it. I am happy to.
come to the conclusion that the law
will not sustain this most unconscionable defence. It ill becomes
the defendants to borrow from the.
plaintiff $r,ooo for a single day, to
relieve their immediate necessities,
and then to turn around and say, ' I
will not return you this money, because you had nlo power by your
charter to lend it.' Let-them first
restore the money, and then it will
be time enough for them to discuss
with the sovereign power of the
State of Connecticut the extent of
the plaintiffs chartered privileges.
We shall lose our respect for the
law when it so far loses its character for justice as to sanction the defence here attempted."

The opinion of COMSToCK, J., in
Bissell v. Railroad Cos., 22 N. Y.,
259, is a thorough discussion of the
entire subject.
In Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow,

63 N. Y., 62, J. ALLEN, on p. 62,
says: "When acts of a corporation
are spoken of as ultra vires, it is
not intended that they are unlawful, or even such as the corporation
cannot perform, but merely those
which are Arot within the powers conferred upon the corporation
by the act of its creation, and are
in violation of the trust reposed in
the managing board by the shareholders, that the affairs shall be
managed and the funds applied
solely for carrying out the objects
for which the corporation was created."
RUGER, C. J., in Nassau Bank v.
Jones, 95 N. Y., 123, said: "While
executed contracts, made by corporations in excess of their legal
powers, have, in some cases, been
upheld by the courts, and parties
have been precluded from setting
up, as a defence to actions brought
by corporations, their want of
power to enter into such contracts
(Bissell v. R. R., 22 N. Y., 258;
Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63
N. Y., 62; Woodruff v. E. R. Co.,
93 N. Y., 618), this doctrine has
never been appfilied to a mere executory.contract, which is sought
to be made the foundation of an
action, either by or against such
corporations."
Bradley v. Ballard (supira), has
already been quoted. State Board
of Agriculture v. Citizens' Railway
Co., 47 Ind., 4o7, decided in 1874,
contains a very full and able discussion of the subject. J. Dow-F,
in his opinion, after stating the
facts, which were analogous, to
those in Davis v. Old Colony R. R.
(supra), said: "The plaintiffs per-

formed their part of the contract,
and on faith of defendant's subscription expended $20,ooo in fitting up said grounds. Yet defend-
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ant refused to pay its share of the
$i,ooo subscribed on September i,
1868, when due. Counsel for defendant urged that the contract in
which the action was founded was
void for want of power in the Street
Railway Co. to make the same.
Counsel for plaintiff submit (intey
alia), that a corporation is estopped
to plead ultra vires when money
has been invested on the faith of
its contract. A distinction may,
perhaps, be well made between the
case where an act of a corporation is
done in violation of an express prohibition in its charter, or in some
other law relating thereto, and the
case where there is simply a defect
of power in the corporation to do
the act. So it appears there are
acts of corporations which strictly
are -ultra vires, and for the doing
of which the State rhay proceed
against the corporation, and yet the
acts of the corporation, under the
particular circumstances, be binding upon the corporation.
"There appears also to be a distinction between the rights of the
parties to a coutractwhich remains
wholly executory and the rights
of parties to a contract when it has
been wholly executed by the party
dealing with the corporation.
"It does not appear that in
making the contract the company

violated any statute by which the
act was prohibited. All that is
claimed is that there is want of
power. The Board of Agriculture
performed its part. The railway
company received benefits, but
seeks to avoid paying the consideration promised on the above
grounds. In onr opinion the company is not at liberty to assume
this position. It has received the
profits resulting from. ihe compliance of the plaintiff with the
contract. These profits, we are at
liberty to presume, have gone to
swell the dividends of the stockholders in that corporation. It
would be unjust for their company
to escape performance of the contract by which these profits have
been realized. If the street railway company has incurred a forfeiture of its charter by the act
done, that is a question for it to
settle with the State."
Northwestern Union Packet Co.
v. Shaw, 37 Wis., 655 (1875) ;
Wright v. Pipe Line Co., et al., ioi
Pa., 204 (1882); Denver Fire Ins.
Co. v. McClelland, 9 Col., ii (1885),
and Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy
Co., 57 Mich., 146, take substantially the same view of the doctrine
of ultra vires:
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